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EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE PUBLIC
WORKS PREVAILING WAGE OBLIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly fifty years, the State of California has maintained a pol-
icy of ensuring adequate wage standards for employees engaged in la-
bor on projects of public work.1 This policy is embodied in a complex
statutory network set forth in the California Labor Code.2
Sections 1771 and 1774 of the Labor Code provide that contrac-
tors3 engaged on projects of public works are obligated to compensate
workers, employed in the execution of the public works contract, at
rates not less than the general prevailing rate of wages4 paid for work
of a similar nature in the locality5 where the labor is performed. The
prevailing wage rate requirement applies to all contractors or subcon-
tractors6 utilizing employee labor in connection 7 with any contract for
public works exceeding five hundred dollars.8 The term "public
works" encompasses, in part, "[c]onstruction, alteration, demolition or
repair work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of
public funds .... -I The term also includes "[w]ork done for irriga-
tion, utility, reclamation and improvement districts" as well as "[s]treet,
1. In 1937, the state legislature enacted CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1771, 1774. Labor Code
Act, Ch. 90 §§ 1771, 1774, 1937 Cal. Stats. 243. These statutes mandate the payment of
wages at rates equal to or exceeding a specified minimum level. Likewise, prior to the enact-
ment of these statutes, the Act of May 25, 1931, Ch. 397 § 1, 1931 Cal. Stats. 910 required
contractors to pay the prevailing rate of wages to employees engaged on public works.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1720-1815 (West 1976).
3. The prevailing wage rate requirement applies only to public work performed under
contract. Thus it does not apply "to work carried out by a public agency with its own
forces." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West Supp. 1981).
4. The prevailing wage rates are ascertained and promulgated by the Director of the
Department of Industrial Relations in accordance with standards and procedures prescribed
by statute. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1770, 1773 (West Supp. 1981). The prevailing wage rate
includes the sums attributable to an employer's payment for health and welfare, pension,
vacation, travel time and subsistence pay. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1773.1 (West Supp. 1981).
Thus, the amount payable to employees engaged on projects of public works equals the
prevailing hourly rates paid to workers in similar crafts or classifications in the area plus the
sums attributable to the usual benefits accorded to workers in these crafts or classifications.
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1724 (West 1971) defines locality as "the county in which the
public work is done in cases in which the contract is awarded by the State, and means the
limits of the political subdivision on whose behalf the contract is awarded in other cases."
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1774 (West 1971).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1772 (West 1971).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West Supp. 1981).
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West Supp. 1981).
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sewer or other improvement work done under the direction and super-
vision or by the authority" of the state or any political subdivision.' 0
Moreover, subject to certain conditions, construction work performed
pursuant to a contract between private individuals falls within the ru-
bric of "public works" if, upon completion of the project, more than 50
percent of the property is leased to the state or a political subdivision."I
It is readily apparent that the prevailing wage rate requirement applies
to a broad spectrum of construction and maintenance activities carried
out by contractors on behalf of the public.
To ensure compliance with the mandate requiring the payment of
prevailing wage rates, Labor Code section 1775 provides that a contrac-
tor shall forfeit as a penalty twenty-five dollars per day for each worker
paid wages at less than the prevailing rate.' 2 The statute further pro-
vides that the difference between the amount of wages due at the pre-
vailing rate and the amount of wages actually paid shall be paid by the
contractor to the worker.' 3 Where an investigation 14 reveals that the
contractor has violated the prevailing wage rate provisions, the public
body which awarded the contract must withhold from sums due to the
contractor an amount sufficient to cover the penalties and balance of
wages due.' 5
In the event that the money due from the awarding body to the
contractor is insufficient to offset the penalties and the balance of wages
due, a suit may be initiated against the contractor for the recovery of
these sums.1 6 The responsibility for the maintenance of such an action
is vested in the State Department of Industrial Relations, Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as the Divi-
sion). 17 The Division must pay the balance of wages due to the work-
ers out of any money recovered in such an action. The funds
remaining, if any, after the wages are paid constitute recovery of the
penalty.'
8
This enforcement mechanism seems, at first glance, adequate to
preserve and enforce the right of public works employees to receive the
10. Id.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720.2 (West Supp. 1981).
12. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1981).
13. Id.
14. An investigation may be made by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement or
the public body awarding the public works contract. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1727 (West 1971).
15. Id.
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full amount of wages due. The Division's enforcement capability is
seriously undermined, however, by the special period of limitations set
forth in Labor Code section 1775. This statute provides that where suit
must be brought by the Division against a public works contractor for
the recovery of wages due at the prevailing rate, "[sluch action shall be
commenced not later than 90 days after the filing of a valid notice of
completion. . . or not later than 90 days after acceptance of such pub-
lic work, whichever last occurs."19 The Division must discover the
existence of the violation, conduct its investigation, and commence a
suit within ninety days of the recordation of notice of completion or
acceptance of the work. In many cases, this short period of limitation
may foreclose the right to recover wages justly earned but unpaid.
This comment explores the issue of whether a right of action, in-
dependent of Labor Code section 1775, is available to public works
employees who are damaged by their employer's failure to pay wages
at the prevailing rate. It suggests that such employees have causes of
action in the nature of an action premised upon a statutory liability and
breach of contract, and that these actions may be brought indepen-
dently of the procedures set forth in Labor Code section 1775. Accord-
ingly, a suit to recover the balance of wages due at the prevailing rate
may be maintained even though the ninety day period after the recor-
dation of a notice of completion or acceptance of the work has expired.
II. ACTION UPON A LIABILITY CREATED By STATUTE
The statutory liability theory may enable public works employees
to bring an action for the recovery of wages after the ninety day period
of limitations set forth in Labor Code section 1775 has expired. Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 338(1) establishes a three year
period of limitations for "[a]n action upon a liability created by statute,
other than a penalty or forfeiture."'2 Arguably, the ninety day limita-
tion period applies only to actions brought by the Division, and the
affected employees have a right of action independent of that enunci-
ated in Labor Code section 1775. This independent right of action is
created by sections 1771 and 1774 of the Labor Code.21 These sections
impose an obligation upon public works contractors to pay prevailing
wage rates to employees engaged on public works. Because this obliga-
tion is imposed by statute, the three year period of limitations is appli-
19. Id.
20. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West Supp. 1981).
21. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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cable.22
In Raymond v. Christian,23 the court engaged in a similar analysis.
The case involved an action taken against California by a state em-
ployee for wages due based upon the difference between the rate re-
ceived and the rate which should have been paid according to civil
service regulations. The court observed that the Civil Service Act im-
posed a duty upon the Civil Service Commission to adopt classifica-
tions and set salary schedules for these classifications.24 The plaintiff
was appointed to a position but was paid at a rate less than the mini-
mum rate adopted for that classification by the commission. The court
ruled that the salary rate upon which the employee based his claim was
created under authority of statute. The obligation to compensate the
employee at the specified rate would not exist but for the statute au-
thorizing the regulatory scheme. "When a duty exists only by virtue of
a statute, or an obligation to pay is fixed in the act itself, the obligation
is one created by statute. Thus, [the] action. . . must be commenced
"125within three years.
In the case of the prevailing wage rate requirement, the obligation
or liability would not exist except by virtue of sections 1771 and 1774.26
The statutory obligation for payment of prevailing wage rates is even
more direct than the obligation encountered in Raymond v. Christian.
In Raymond, the wage rate obligation arose out of a regulation promul-
gated under a general statutory scheme.27 The public works legislation,
on the other hand, specifically mandates that the contractor must pay
the prevailing wage rates as determined under the regulatory scheme.28
Since this obligation is created by statute, an action may be com-
menced by the employees within a three year period 29 notwithstanding
the ninety day period of limitations applicable to actions brought by
the state under Labor Code section 1775.30
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West Supp. 1981).
23: 24 Cal. App. 2d 92, 74 P.2d 536 (1937).
24. Id. at 114, 74 P.2d at 548 (citing Act of March 26, 1903, ch. 364 § 2153(a), 1903 Cal.
Stats. 485 (repealed 1937)).
25. 24 Cal. App. 2d at 115, 74 P.2d at 548 (citation omitted).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1771, 1774 (West Supp. 1981).
27. 24 Cal. App. 2d at 114, 74 P.2d at 548.
28. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
30. A potential impediment exists, however, to proceeding under the foregoing analysis.
An action brought by a public works employee for the recovery of wages due at the prevail-
ing rate will be foreclosed unless the court is satisfied that Labor Code section 1775 is not




Ill. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF CONTRACT
While an action premised upon a statutory liability would appear
to resurrect the possibility of recovering wages when the ninety day
period of limitations has expired, an alternative approach exists which
may yield the same result. The public works employee damaged as a
result of a contractor's failure to pay wages at the prevailing rate may,
under appropriate circumstances, disregard the statutory basis for re-
covery and proceed under the common law theory of breach of con-
tract.
Labor Code section 1775 requires that the public works contract
contain a stipulation that the contractor will comply with the statutory
provision respecting the payment of prevailing wage rates.31 The con-
tract thus incorporates the prevailing wage rate requirement, and the
payment of wages at the stipulated rate becomes a contractual obliga-
tion.32 This obligation necessarily inures to the benefit of the employ-
ees engaged in the execution of the public works contract because these
rates form the basis of the compensation they receive for their labor.
33
Since this term of the contract operates for the benefit of the employees
engaged in its execution, the employees have standing to enforce the
obligation as third party beneficiaries of the contract.
A. Traditional View: The Donee-Creditor Benefciary Dichotomy
In 1872, the California Legislature codified the common law prin-
31. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part that "the body
awarding the contract shall cause to be inserted in the contract a stipulation that the provi-
sions of this section will be complied with."
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1773.2 (West Supp. 1981) gives further impetus to the theory that
the prevailing wage rate requirement is intended to be a term of the public works contract.
The section provides that "[t]he body awarding any contract for public work. . . shall spec-
ify in the call for bids for the contract, and in the bid specifications and in the contract itself,
what the general rate of per diem wages is for each craft, classification or type of workman
needed to execute the contract." This statute also provides an alternative method of compli-
ance consisting of express references in the call for bids and in the contract that the pub-
lished prevailing wage rates are on file with the awarding body and are available to
interested parties on request. Clearly, one purpose of the statute is to require that informa-
tion is made available to acquaint the contractor with the prevailing wage rate requirement
for purposes of preparation of the bid on the contract. Accordingly, the requirement is
within the contemplation of the parties when the bid is made and subsequently accepted by
the awarding body and when the contract is formally executed. Therefore, because the wage
rate requirement is within the parties' contemplation at the time the contract is entered into
and an express stipulation that the prevailing wage rate provision will be complied with is
made a part of the contract, the wage rate requirement is a contractual obligation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5, Comments b and c (1980). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1980).
33. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
19811
LOYOI OF LOS NGELES LAW REVIEW [
ciple that third party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to en-
force the performance of a contract. The statute states that "[a]
contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be en-
forced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.
' 34
As interpreted by the California courts, this statute gives a right of
action to those not a party to the contract who fall within the category
of either donee or creditor beneficiary as set forth in section 133 of the
Restatement of Contracts.35 The Restatement labels as a donee benefi-
ciary a person who will benefit from performance of a promise in a
contract
if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the ac-
companying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee
in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance
thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon
him a right against the promisor to some performance . . 36
The Restatement categorizes the benefited person as a creditor benefici-
ary if "performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the benefi-
ciary against the promisee which has been barred. . . .-3 A benefici-
ary falling into either the donee or creditor beneficiary category is owed
a duty by the promisor and the beneficiary may enforce the perform-
ance of this obligation for his own benefit.38
If the beneficiary fails to meet the conditions of either of the above
described categories, he is deemed to be an incidental beneficiary 9 and
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
35. The California Supreme Court has declared that "American law generally classifies
persons having enforceable rights under contracts to which they are not parties as either
creditor beneficiaries or donee beneficiaries. (Rest. Contracts, §§ 133, subds. (1), (2), 135,
136, 147. . . .) California decisions follow this classification." Martinez v. Socoma Cos.,
11 Cal. 3d 394, 400, 521 P.2d 841, 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1974); see Southern Cal. Gas
Co. v. ABC Constr. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 752,22 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544 (1962) (California
cases follow the RESTATEMENT classifications); I B. W1TKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Contracts § 500 (8th ed. 1973). Moreover, a court of appeal has held that the classifi-
cation scheme is consistent with Civil Code § 1559 notwithstanding the use of the term "ex-
pressly" in that section: "[Civil Code] [s]ection 1559 says 'expressly for the benefit of the
third party.' The word 'expressly,' by judicial interpretation, has now come to mean merely
the negative of 'incidentally."' Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co., 82
Cal. App. 3d 65, 70, 145 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450 (1978).
36. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(a) (1932) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 133(l)(b).
38. Id. §§ 135-136.
39. The RESTATEMENT defines an incidental beneficiary as one who is neither a donee
nor a creditor beneficiary. Id. § 133(1)(c).
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lacks standing to enforce the contract.40 Under this analysis, it is neces-
sary that the public works employees be viewed as falling within either
the donee or the creditor beneficiary classification scheme if they are to
acquire a right of action under this theory against the contractor for the
recovery of their wages. The California Supreme Court has recognized
that
[e]ven though a person is not the intended recipient of a gift,
he may nevertheless be a 'donee beneficiary if it appears from
the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circum-
stances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the
promise . . . is . . . to confer upon him a right against the
promisor to some performance. ... "'
As previously noted, the awarding body inserts the prevailing
wage rate provision into the public works contract in recognition of the
employee's right to receive wages at the prevailing rate.42 The prom-
isee thereby expresses its intent, consistent with public policy, that em-
ployees engaged on the public works project should be paid wages at
the rates prevailing in the locality. Clearly, this contractual term is not
intended to confer a gift upon the employees. The provision is in-
tended to confer a right against the promisor (contractor) to payment of
wages at the prevailing rate. Consequently, the employees meet the
criteria established for donee beneficiaries43 and cannot be considered
mere incidental beneficiaries. Under this analysis, the employees have
standing to maintain an action against the contractor for his breach of
the public works contract.
B. Modern View Intended vs. Incidental Beneficiaries
It must be observed that the law in California, concerning the ap-
plicable test for distinguishing between those third parties who may
maintain an action on a contract inuring to their benefit and those who
have no such standing, is in a state of flux. The bifurcated approach to
the third party beneficiary analysis, which at times necessitates a con-
trived molding of complicated fact patterns into an artificial creditor-
donee categorization scheme, is beginning to be viewed with disfavor
40. The RESTATEMENT provides that "[a]n incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of
the promise no right against the promisor. . . ." Id. § 147.
41. Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589
(emphasis in original). See Note, Martinez v. Socoma Companies: Problems in Determining
Contract Beneiciaries'Rights, 27 HAST. L.J. 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Contract Benefi-
ciaries' Rights].
42. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 36 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
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by the legal community." This doctrinal change has resulted primarily
from the difficulties and confusion encountered in trying to classify
cases into the categories.
4-
An alternative test for distinguishing beneficiaries with enforcea-
ble rights from those lacking such rights, is set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. 6 Under this analysis, beneficiaries are deemed
to be either intended or incidental beneficiaries:
[A] beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if rec-
ognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appro-
priate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance . . . will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circum-
stances indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefici-
ary the benefit of the promised performance.47
The Restatement (Second) defines an incidental beneficiary negatively;
any beneficiary who is not intended is incidental. 41 Under the Restate-
ment (Second), the promise may be enforced by an intended benefici-
ary whereas an incidental beneficiary has no enforceable right.49 Thus,
the modern approach is to eliminate the artificial creditor-donee cate-
gorization scheme and approach the problem using an intent stan-
dard. 0
There can be no doubt that the prevailing wage rate stipulation is
inserted by the awarding body (promisee) in the public works contract
for the purpose of ensuring the payment of prevailing wage rates to
employees5' engaged on the project.52 Since the employees are the di-
44. A California Court of Appeal has recently observed that:
Ihe creditor-donee dichotomy as applied to third party beneficiaries is beginning
to vanish. Although the two concepts are still viable, the specific descriptive words
are being dropped by the courts and academicians to permit broader application of
the doctrine. Restatement Second of Contracts (Tent. Draft No.4), supra, section
133, subdivisions (1), (2), for example, has recognized the need for a change and
has done so by eliminating the creditor-donee terminology.
Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 451. (The section number cited by the court has been changed to § 302(l)-(2) in the 1980
Official Text.).
45. Contract Benefciaries' Rights, supra note 41, at 143.
46. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ComxcrRs § 302(1) (1980).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 302(2).
49. Id. §§ 304, 315.
50. With respect to the intent-to-benefit test, it is important to note that the focus is upon
the prom/see's intent. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 825 (1961).
51. The employees need not be specifically named as beneficiaries in the contract. It is
sufficient that the beneficiary is a person or a member of a class for whose benefit the prom-
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rect recipients of the wages, it is apparent that the provision is intended
to give the employees the benefit of the promised performance. Ac-
cordingly, the employees satisfy the intent-to-benefit test and qualify as
intended beneficiaries.
A case which illustrates these principles and is analogous to the
issues under consideration is Shell v. Schmidt.53 In Shell, the defend-
ant was a building contractor who had entered into an agreement with
the federal government under which he received priorities for building
materials to build homes with required specifications for sale to war
veterans at or below ceiling prices. Plaintiffs were twelve veterans, each
of whom had purchased a home that failed to comply with the agreed
specifications. They were held entitled to recover directly from the de-
fendant contractor as third party beneficiaries of his agreement with the
government.
The court held in part that:
[T]he statute and the regulations passed thereunder resulting
in the contract were passed to aid and assist veterans and for
their benefit. Purchasing veterans constitute the class in-
tended to be benefited, and the contract must therefore be for
their benefit.
Under Section 1559 of the Civil Code, embodying gen-
eral common law principles, a third party beneficiary may
maintain an action directly on such a contract. . . . The
promise in such a situation is treated as having been made
directly to the third party. . . . It is no objection to an action
by the third party that the contracting party (here the govern-
ment) could also sue upon the contract for the same breach.
5 4
The circumstances involved in the present discussion may be ana-
lyzed similarly. Labor Code sections 1771 and 1774 mandate that a
contractor pay prevailing wage rates to employees engaged on public
works. 5 The contractual provisions resulting from this statutory obli-
gation were designed to aid employees engaged on such public works.56
As such, the employees constitute the class57 intended to be benefited.58
ise was made. Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82, 89 (1954), cer.
denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 306 (1980).
52. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
53. 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955).
54. Id. at 290, 272 P.2d at 89.
55. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 51 supra.
58. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
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As intended beneficiaries, the employees, under the common law prin-
ciples expressed in Civil Code section 1559,-9 may maintain an action
directly on the contract.60
Although the court in Shell did not rely on the principles set forth
in the Restatement of Contracts section 145,61 the California Supreme
Court, in Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc. 62 has analyzed Shell in
connection with this section of the Restatement. Even though it would
appear that Restatement section 145 is not controlling in the context of
the present case, 63 it may prove informative to engage in a similar anal-
ysis.
The Restatement of Contracts states:
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or munic-
ipality by contract to do an act or render a service to some or
all of the members of the public, is subject to no duty under
the contract to such members to give compensation for the
injurious consequences of performing or attempting to per-
form it, or of failing to do so, unless,. . . an intention is man-
ifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the
circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor
shall compensate members of the public for such injurious
consequences .... 64
In Martinez, the California Supreme Court observed that under section
145 of the Restatement, the plaintiffs in Shell were entitled to maintain
an action as third party beneficiaries of the contract between the gov-
ernment and the building contractor because there was a manifestation
of intent that the contractor should pay compensation for breach to
persons in the position of plaintiffs. The court stated:
The legislation under which the agreement was made in-
59. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
60. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
61. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932).
62. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
63. Arguably, the purpose of RESTATEMENT § 145 is to preclude suits against govern-
ment contractors by members of the public at large unless members of the general public
qualify under the exceptions specified in that section. However, it is inconsistent with the
policy expressed in RESTATEMENT § 133 and unduly restrictive to conclude that section 145
operates to preclude actions taken by third parties who are identifiable intended benefi-
ciaries of the contract and are thus set apart from the general public. See Contract Benoq.
ciaries' Rights, supra note 41, at 155-56; Comment, Third Party Benefciaries In Government
Contracts, 63 CALiF. L. REv. 126, 129-32 (1975). Moreover, the American Law Institute has
recognized the potential for unduly restrictive interpretations of section 145 and has sought
to remedy the problem in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1980). See also J.
CALAMAI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 247 (1970).
64. REsTATEmENT OF CoNTRACTs § 145 (1932).
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cluded a provision empowering the government to obtain
payment of monetary compensation by the contractor to the
veteran purchasers for deficiencies resulting from failure to
comply with specifications. Thus, there was "an intention
, * . manifested in the contract . . . that the promisor shall
compensate members of the public for such injurious conse-
quences [of non-performance].
' 65
In other words, the plaintiffs in Shell had a right to maintain an action
against the contractor under the conditions set forth in Restatement
section 145 because the legislation underlying the contract gave the
government the right to sue contractors who had failed to comply with
building specifications in order to obtain from these contractors com-
pensation for veterans who had purchased deficient dwellings.
This reasoning is applicable to the issues here under consideration.
The legislation upon which the prevailing wage rate stipulation in the
public works contract is premised (California Labor Code sections
1700-1775) includes a provision empowering the government to obtain
payment of monetary compensation by the contractor to employees for
his failure to pay the prevailing wage rates. Labor Code section 1775
states that the government may maintain an action for "[t]he difference
between such prevailing wage rates and the amount paid to each work-
man for each calendar day or portion thereof for which each workman
was paid less than the prevailing wage rate."' 66 Utilizing the precise
analysis engaged in by the court in Martinez, it is evident that Restate-
ment section 145 is not a bar to a breach of contract action brought by
the public works employees as third party beneficiaries. An intention
will be manifest in a public works contract, drafted in accordance with
statutory mandates, that the promisor shall compensate members of the
public for such injurious consequences of nonperformance. As in
Shell, this intention will be manifested by the fact that legislation em-
powering the government to take action against the contractor is an
underlying basis for the contractual provision in question.67 Therefore,
even though the applicability of Restatement section 145 is questiona-
ble in the context of the present analysis, 68 if it is found to be applica-
65. Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d at 403, 521 P.2d at 847, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591
(footnote omitted).
66. CAL. LAB. CoIon § 1775 (West Supp. 1981).
67. Section 1775 expressly empowers the government to take action against a violating
public works contractor to compensate employees damaged by his nonperformance. This
same statute also mandates that the public works contract contain a stipulation that the
prevailing wage rate requirements will be complied with.
68. See note 63 supra.
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ble, the damaged employees satisfy the criteria of that section, as
interpreted by the California Supreme Court, and as such have stand-
ing to maintain a common law action against the promisor.
C The Law in Other Jurisdictions
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the law in California re-
lating to third party beneficiaries unquestionably supports the proposi-
tion that public works employees may maintain an action for breach of
contract against the violating contractor. This position has been ad-
dressed in numerous other jurisdictions, but the conclusions have not
been consonant.
In Willis v. E. Z DuPont de Nemours & Co. ,69 the federal govern-
ment had entered into a written contract with the defendant contractor
for the construction of a new ordinance facility. The contract con-
tained a provision requiring the contractor to compensate his workmen
at the prevailing wages specified by the Secretary of Labor.70 Another
provision required payment of wages at the rate of time and one-half
for hours worked in excess of eight per day. Plaintiff and his assignors
were employed by the contractor in the construction of the facility.
Plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the contractor for its
failure to remunerate its workmen in accordance with these provisions
of the contract. Reliance upon any federal statute was specifically dis-
claimed. Plaintiff alleged only that the provisions respecting wages
were inserted in the contract for the benefit of the employees and that
the contract had been breached.7 1 The court noted that the contract
provisions relied upon were included in order that the contract might
conform to the requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act.72 It rejected
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the statute and to state a claim based upon
common law breach-of-contract concepts, concluding that the plaintiff
failed to prove that the public works employees were intended benefi-
ciaries of the compensation clause in the contract.73
Other courts, however, have reached contrary conclusions on the
issue of whether a public works employee is a third party beneficiary of
a contract containing a stipulation with respect to prevailing wage
69. 76 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Okla.), rev'don other grounds, 171 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1948).
70. The provision was inserted into the contract according to the requirements of the
federal Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-276(c) (1976).
71. 76 F. Supp. at 1012.
72. The prevailing wage rate provisions of the federal Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 276(a)-276(c) (1976), are substantively identical to California's prevailing wage legisla-
tion.
73. 76 F. Supp. at 1014.
[ ol. 14
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
rates. In Fata v. S. A. Healy Co. ,7 the high court of the State of New
York ruled that an employee of a contractor engaged in public works
may maintain a common law action against the contractor, as a third
party beneficiary, for violation of a provision of the contract entered
into between the contractor and a public agency, for the payment of
prevailing wage rates. The applicable public works statute7" provided
that a schedule of prevailing wage rates was to be annexed to the con-
tract. The court observed that this prevailing wage rate statute was in-
tended to directly benefit those employed on a project of public
works.76 It reasoned that the statutory requirement that public works
contracts contain a prevailing wage rate provision was also for the di-
rect benefit of the recipient of the wages.77 Accordingly, the court held
that the employees were entitled to pursue the statutory remedy or to
bring an action premised on the contract.78
In Stover v. Winston Bros. Co. ,79 an action to recover the difference
between wages paid and the rate provided for in a public works con-
tract between the city of Seattle and a building contractor was brought
by plaintiff on behalf of employees of the contractor whose claims had
been assigned to him. Pursuant to a city ordinance, the public works
contract incorporated the provisions of the city charter and the city or-
dinances as to wages for labor and provided that the defendant's em-
ployees on the work should not be paid less than the current rate of
wages paid by the municipality for similar work. The Washington
Supreme Court observed that the primary purpose of the contractual
compensation provision was to benefit the employees engaged on the
project.80 After examining in detail the progression of the law of third
party beneficiaries since the famous case of Lawrence v. Fox,81 the
court announced that the public works employees were intended bene-
ficiaries of the wage provision in the contract and had standing to sue
74. 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943).
75. The New York public works statute provided that "[t]he wages to be paid for a legal
day's work. . . to laborers, workmen or mechanics upon such public works, shall not be less
than the prevailing rate of wages. . ." and that each contract made by a contractor for such
public works "shall contain a provision that each laborer, workman or mechanic. . . shall
be paid the wages herein provided." Act of Apr. 5, 1935, ch. 300, 1935 N.Y. Laws 791 (cur-
rent version at N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980)). The New York statute is
strikingly similar to the California prevailing wage rate legislation. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1770-1775 (West 1971).
76. 289 N.Y. at 405, 46 N.E.2d at 341.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 185 Wash. 416, 55 P.2d 821, appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 508 (1936).
80. Id. at 425, 55 P.2d at 824.
81. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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on the contract for the recovery of their wages.8 2 The court then held
that because the cause of action was based upon the common law the-
ory of breach of contract, the statute of limitations applicable to breach
of written contracts was to be applied. 3
Similarly, the court inAustin Bridge Co. v. Teague, 4 considered an
action brought against a contractor by an employee who alleged that he
was a third party beneficiary of a provision in a contract between the
contractor and the State of Texas mandating the payment of prevailing
wage rates. The state's prevailing wage statute8 5 provided that a public
works contractor was to pay not less than the prevailing wage rate, such
rate to be determined by the state, and that a penalty would be for-
feited by the contractor for failure to pay the applicable rate. The stat-
ute further provided that a stipulation as to the stated requirement was
to be included in the contract.86 As to the issue of plaintiff's right of
action as a third party beneficiary of the public works contract, the
court observed that because the statute required that a prevailing wage
rate clause was to be inserted in the contract, an intent was manifested
that the employees were to be benefited by this contractual provision.
The court ruled that the employees were third party beneficiaries of the
contract, and as such, they were entitled to bring a breach of contract
action against the violating contractor.
87
Recently, in Rogers v. Speros Construction Co. ,88 the Arizona
Court of Appeals ruled that employees of a public works contractor are
third party beneficiaries of a prevailing wage rate provision contained
in a contract between the contractor and the awarding body. 9 The
contract specified that the contractor was to pay the general rate of per
diem wages as determined by the Industrial Commission of Arizona.
The court observed that the "[pilaintiffs' claims are predicated on the
contract itself, and not upon the [public works] statute. The general
contractor agreed that wages would be paid at a specified rate ...."90
The court then declared that plaintiffs had a right of action against the
general contractor as third party beneficiaries of the public works con-
82. 185 Wash. at 428, 55 P.2d at 826.
83. Id. at 429, 55 P.2d at 826.
84. 149 S.W.2d 674, rev'don other grounds, 137 Tex. 119, 152 S.W.2d 1091 (1941).
85. Id., citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5159(a) (Vernon 1971).
86. These aspects of the Texas prevailing wage rate legislation are similar to the Califor-
nia provisions. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1770-1775 (West 1971).
87. 149 S.W.2d at 677.
88. 119 Ariz. 289, 580 P.2d 750 (1978).
89. Id. at 292-93, 580 P.2d at 753.




Although the conclusions respecting the third party beneficiary
status of public works employees have not been unanimous in the vari-
ous jurisdictions, the theory is certainly viable. Moreover, this theory is
particularly attractive when considered in light of the evolution of the
law in California concerning third party beneficiaries of contract.
Assuming the public works employees have standing to maintain
an action on the contractor's breach of the prevailing wage rate provi-
sion in the public works contract,92 the applicable statute of limitations
is four years.93 Thus, by disclaiming reliance on the statutory provi-
sions respecting the contractor's prevailing wage rate obligation and
framing a cause of action for breach of contract, the damaged employ-
ees stand in a more favorable procedural position. This position may
enable such employees to bring a direct action for the recovery of
wages due where recovery may otherwise be foreclosed under the pro-
cedural strictures imposed upon an action taken by the Division under
Labor Code section 1775.11
IV. EXCLUSIVENESS OF STATUTORY REMEDY
The rule concerning the exclusiveness of statutory remedies raises
a potential barrier to a direct action taken by public works employees
for the recovery of wages due at the prevailing rate. The generally ac-
cepted rule of law is that if a new right is created by statute and the
remedy for violation of that right is prescribed by the statute, then the
statutory remedy is exclusive.95 Thus, it may be argued that because
Labor Code section 1775 sets up a remedial procedure for the recovery
of wages, where the contractor has violated the statutorily created right
91. Id. at 292-93, 580 P.2d at 753.
92. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed .that the public works contract is in
writing.
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (West Supp. 1981) provides that "[a]n action upon any
contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be commenced
within four years.
94. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Proceeding under this theory may also resur-
rect the right of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement to proceed against the violat-
ing public works contractor. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(a) (West Supp. 1981) provides that the
Division shall take assignment of employees' claims for wages. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.3
(West Supp. 1981) provides that the Division may "prosecute all actions for the collection of
wages." Thus, when the ninety day period of limitations set forth in section 1775 has ex-
pired, the Division may nevertheless proceed by taking assignment of the employees' claims
and prosecuting an action against the contractor for breach of contract under the third party
beneficiary theory.
95. 1 AM. JUR. 2dActions § 73 (1962); 56 CJ.S. Master Servant § 160(1) (1948); Gold v.
Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 373, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732, 738 (1975).
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to prevailing wage rates, the statutory remedy must be pursued to the
exclusion of all other remedies.96
This position is subject to attack, however, predicated upon the
exceptions to the general rule which have been recognized by courts in
California. One exception arises when the right was established at
common law or by statute before the new statutory remedy was en-
acted. Under these circumstances, the statutory remedy is considered
cumulative to the older remedy, and the plaintiff may elect to pursue
either course of action.97
The statutory right to wages at the prevailing rate was enacted by
the California Legislature in 1931.98 The concomitant statutory reme-
dial provision was not enacted until 1963. 99 Thus, the statutory right
existed prior to the enactment of the statutory remedy and the case
would fall within the exception to the general rule relating to exclusive-
ness of statutory remedies.
Moreover, where a cause of action is not predicated upon the con-
tractor's breach of the statutory duty, but proceeds on the common law
theory of breach of contract, a similar result would follow. In 1872, the
96. This argument was successfully raised in two public works cases arising in Tennes-
see. In those cases, the court held that since the applicable statute provided that all disputes
concerning prevailing wage rates must be referred to the Secretary of Labor for determina-
tion, employees were foreclosed from bringing an action at law where they had failed to
submit their dispute to the Secretary. A.W. Kutsche & Co. v. Anderson, 169 Tenn. 98, 83
S.W.2d 243 (1935); A.W. Kutsche & Co. v. Keith, 169 Tenn. 399, 88 S.W.2d 454 (1935).
Accord, Southern Prison Co. v. Rennels, 110 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (statutory
remedy providing that only the commissioners court had the power to determine the per
diem wage rate on public works contracts is exclusive).
97. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954) provides that "[t]he common law of England, so
far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with. . . the. . . laws of this State, is the rule of
decision in the courts of this State." In the context of the present discussion, this statute
means that "where a right exists at common law a statutory remedy for its enforcement is
but cumulative, and ordinarily the common law remedy, or that afforded by statute may be
pursued." Jewett v. City Transfer & Storage Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 559, 18 P.2d 351, 352
(1933). Accord, Estate of Ward, 127 Cal. App. 347, 354, 15 P.2d 901, 904 (1932) (statutory
remedy cumulative to pre-existing common law remedy); Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d
at 287, 272 P.2d at 86 (common law remedy not displaced by statutory remedy); Grey v.
Sutherland, 124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 290, 268 P.2d 754, 761 (1954) (common law remedy may
be pursued notwithstanding subsequently enacted statutory remedy).
98. Act of May 25, 1931, ch. 397, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stats. 910 (current version at CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1771 (West Supp. 1981) and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1774 (West 1971)).
99. Act of May 18, 1963, ch. 467, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stats. 1320 (current version at CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1981)). Prior to the 1963 amendment, Labor Code § 1775 pro-
vided that the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement could bring an action for the recov-
ery of statutory penalties due under that section. The 1963 amendment added language
expressly authorizing the Division to bring an action for recovery of the other "amounts
due." This language implicitly refers to wages due at the prevailing rate.
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California Legislature gave statutory recognition to the common law
right of action held by third party beneficiaries of contracts. ° Clearly,
the common law right of third party beneficiaries to bring an action for
damages upon a contractual breach predated the statutory remedy es-
tablished for the recovery of wages due at the prevailing rate.' 0' There-
fore, since the common law right of action for breach of contract
existed prior to the statutory obligation, the statutory remedy should be
deemed non-exclusive and the aggrieved employee should be permitted
to pursue either course.
10 2
It is patent that when a remedial statute expressly characterizes a
remedy as exclusive, no other may be pursued." 3 Where, however, the
statute is silent on this point, courts have looked to legislative intent to
determine whether the statutory remedy is exclusive."w For example,
in Shell v. Schmidt, 10 5 the court determined that the statutes under con-
sideration'0 6 were passed for the purpose of benefiting an identifiable
group.10 7 The court reasoned that the fundamental purpose of the stat-
ute would, in many cases, be defeated because of the relatively short
period of limitations set forth in the statute if the statutory remedies
were considered exclusive.' 08 Thus, the court allowed the damaged
group to proceed as third party beneficiaries of the contract under the
common law theory of breach of contract, holding that the statute
merely created new remedies without displacing others.'0 9
This reasoning is applicable to the issues presently under consider-
100. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
101. See note 99 supra.
102. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Modem Barber College v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 31
Cal. 2d 720, 723-24, 192 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1948) (statutory remedy is exclusive when statute
expressly prohibits other methods of redress).
104. 1 AM. JUR. 2d Actions § 76 (1962).
105. 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955). See text
accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
106. The statute under consideration was the Veterans Emergency Housing Act of 1946,
ch. 268, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 207.
107. The group benefited by the Act consisted of veterans purchasing homes under the
Act. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 286, 272 P.2d at 87.
108. The court observed:
We agree with respondents that the federal statute should not be interpreted as
containing the exclusive remedies of purchasers so as to deprive them of their com-
mon law remedies. To do so would be to deprive veterans of most important
rights, and after one year from the date of purchase (the statute of limitations pro-
vided in the statute for the statutory remedies of purchasers) to confer immunity on
contractors in their relations with purchasers. This would be in subversion of the
very purpose and intent of the statute.
Id. at 285, 272 P.2d at 86.
109. Id. at 287, 272 P.2d at 87.
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ation. The prevailing wage rate provisions do not contain express pro-
nouncements that the remedies set forth therein for the collection of
wages are intended to be exclusive.110 Moreover, this legislation di-
rectly benefits an identifiable group, the employees to whom the wages
are to be paid. If the statutory remedy were exclusive, the damaged
employees could recover only if the Division were able to file an action
within the ninety-day period of limitations."' It is evident that in
many cases this short period of limitation would operate to deprive em-
ployees of wages lawfully due to them, and the violating contractors
would escape with impunity. Under these circumstances, the purpose
of the statute would be defeated and public policy would be under-
mined. Accordingly, under the principles enunciated in Shell, the stat-
utory remedy set forth in Labor Code section 1775 should be
considered as merely cumulative to the existing common law remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
California has long maintained the policy of ensuring an adequate
wage scale for employees engaged on projects of public works. This
statutory benefit may prove illusory in many instances, however, be-
cause of the procedural strictures imposed upon the governmental body
charged with the enforcement of the prevailing wage provisions. The
ninety day period of limitations applicable to such enforcement pro-
ceedings will, in many cases, inevitably operate to foreclose the right to
recover wages which were earned but unpaid by the violating contrac-
tor. This procedural limitation casts'the state into the posture of giving
a benefit with one hand and taking it away with the other. This anom-
alous state of affairs may be corrected, however, if the courts allow the
aggrieved employees to bring a direct action against the violating con-
110. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1981) sets forth the remedial procedures to be
followed by the Division for the collection of wages. There is no express indication in this
statute that it is intended as the exclusive remedy. Furthermore, the statute's legislative
history clearly indicates the legislature's intent that the statute not serve as the exclusive
remedy. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1781, prior to its repeal by Act of May 10, 1957, ch. 396, § 1,
1957 Cal. Stats. 1240, read as follows: "The penalties and remedies provided for in §§ 1775
and 1777 shall be the exclusive penalties and remedies against any contractor or subcontrac-
tor for any violation of §§ 1770 to 1777 or of the provisions inserted in any call for bids;
specifications or contracts pursuant thereto." Labor Code Act, ch. 90, § 1781, 1937 Cal.
Stats. 245. Subsequent to the repeal of this exclusivity statute, the legislature amended La-
bor Code § 1775 to permit the Division to bring an action against the violating contractor
for the recovery of wages as well as for penalties. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
A reasonable inference drawn from these legislative actions is that the remedial procedures
expressed in Labor Code § 1775 are not exclusive.
I11. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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tractor. If the damaged employees are allowed to pursue a direct ac-
tion, disclaiming any reliance upon Labor Code section 1775, their
right of recovery will be resurrected and public policy will be vindi-
cated.
Such an independent action should be available under two theo-
ries. First, employees may rely upon the statutes which require the
contractor to pay wages at the designated scale. A cause of action may
thus be framed around the contractor's breach of this statutory duty.
Proceeding under this theory would enable employees to bring a recov-
ery action within three years of the violation.
Alternatively, employees may disclaim reliance upon the prevail-
ing wage statutes altogether, and bring a common law action premised
upon breach of contract. Employees damaged as a result of the con-
tractor's breach of the prevailing wage stipulation, contained in the
public works contract, may sue to enforce the obligation as third party
beneficiaries of the contract. Under this theory employees may initiate
an action within four years of the contractor's breach.
Acceptance by the courts of either theory of recovery would sub-
stantially protect the rights conferred by the state upon public works
employees. This conclusion is consistent with public policy and is also
just and equitable.
James L. Payne
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